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INTRODUCTION
1

In 1963, in Gideon v. Wainright, the United States Supreme
Court established the constitutional mandate that all indigent
defendants charged with a felony should be provided a lawyer at
government expense, regardless of whether that defendant was
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has been since 1996. The authors would like to thank Michael Minard for all of
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Public Defense for gathering data regarding the statewide public defender system
in Minnesota; and Pat Dalton, Joel Michael, Kathy Novak, and Rebecca Pirius of
the Minnesota House of Representatives Research Department for providing
invaluable information regarding state finances and potential taxation revenue.
Finally, we would like to thank the Hennepin County Public Defender’s Office for
all of the support during the writing of the article.
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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2

charged in state court or federal court. In the years that followed,
the United States Supreme Court expanded the constitutional right
3
4
to a lawyer to include: juvenile delinquency cases, misdemeanors,
5
6
first appeals, in person line-ups, and cases involving suspended jail
7
sentences. The Court also expanded the states’ obligation to pay
for nonattorney resources necessary to protect the defendant’s
8
right to a fair trial. While the courts have expanded the right to

2. Prior to Gideon, several states provided indigent defendants with
government paid lawyers in capital and noncapital serious felony cases. See Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 477–79 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting) (listing the thirty-five
states which recognized the right to a government provided lawyer, either by
statute, judicial decision, established practice, or state constitution).
3. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (noting that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution required that in a
proceeding where a juvenile could potentially be committed to an institution, “the
child and his parents must be notified of the child’s right to be represented by
counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will
be appointed to represent that child”).
4. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1972) (recognizing that “the
problems associated with misdemeanors and petty offenses often require the
presence of counsel to insure the accused a fair trial,” the Court held that “no
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty,
misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”); see
also Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001) (reiterating that “any
amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance”).
5. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963) (noting that the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution is violated “where the
rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel’s examination into
the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while
the indigent . . . has only the right to a meaningless ritual”).
6. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223 (1967).
7. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002) (noting that a defendant is
entitled to counsel on a case where he received a suspended sentence); cf. Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (noting that no constitutional right to a lawyer exists if
the sole sentence imposed is a fine).
8. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (noting that “fundamental
fairness entitles indigent defendants to ‘an adequate opportunity to present their
claims fairly within the adversary system’” (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,
612 (1974))). Furthermore, “justice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of
his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a
judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake.” Id. at 76. Moreover, the court
stated that:
mere access to the courthouse doors does not by itself assure a
proper functioning of the adversary process, and that a criminal
trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an
indigent defendant without making certain that he has access to
the raw materials integral to the building of an effective
defense.
Id. at 77.
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counsel, they have provided no guidance to states on how to deliver
indigent defense or how to pay for indigent defense.
It is here that the state and local governments have failed to
live up to their obligations. Nearly half a century after Gideon,
9
indigent defense remains in a state of crisis. Indigent defense is
10
woefully underfunded. Lawyers providing indigent defense are
overwhelmed with case volume and complexity, and often struggle
11
to devote the time, energy, and resources each case deserves, even
in times of economic prosperity. During the economic downturns
9. See, e.g., Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal
Cases, a National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1045 (2006) (noting “[b]y every
measure in every report analyzing the U.S. criminal justice system, the defense
function for poor people is drastically underfinanced”); Norman Lefstein, In
Search of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons from England and the Need for Federal Help, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 835, 838 (2004) (“[F]orty years after Gideon, this nation is still
struggling to implement the right to counsel in state criminal and juvenile
proceedings.”); A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 1
(2004) (noting that “forty years after the Gideon decision, the promise of equal
justice for the poor remains unfulfilled in this county”) [hereinafter GIDEON’S
BROKEN PROMISE]; Margaret H. Lemos, Civil Challenges to the Use of Low-Bid Contracts
for Indigent Defense, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1808, 1809 n.14 (2000) (discussing articles
ranging from 1967 through 1993 detailing the problems with indigent defense
due to inadequate funding); Robert L. Spangenberg & Tessa J. Schwartz, The
Indigent Defense Crisis is Chronic, 9 CRIM. JUST. 13 (1994) (discussing the impact of
charging more cases while providing less resources for indigent defense); Penny J.
White, Mourning and Celebrating Gideon’s Fortieth, 72 UMKC L. REV. 515, 516
(2003) (noting that “every major study that had been conducted from the late
1970s through the late 1980s concluded that the right to counsel remained largely
unfulfilled”); Editorial, Hard Times and the Right to Counsel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
2008 (noting that as a result of “state revenue in free fall, the problem [of
underfunded indigent defense] is reaching crisis proportions and creating a legal
and moral challenge for the criminal justice system, state legislatures, and the legal
profession”); NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S
CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 4, 50 (2009)
[hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED], available at http://www.constitutionproject.org
/manage/file/139.pdf.
10. See Spangenberg & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 13 (noting that in 1990
spending on indigent defense was still less than one-third of that spent on
prosecution); see also, infra notes 56–63 and accompanying text; White, supra note
9, at 516 (noting that in 1979 combined state and local government spending on
indigent defense was about one-quarter of what was spent on prosecution); BILL
WHITEHURST, A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION #110, at 1, 2 (2004)
(noting the “woefully inadequate” funding for indigent defense and accurately
predicting that the funding crises will worsen after 2004 given state budget
deficits), available at www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense
/rec110.pdf.
11. See infra notes 111–140 and accompanying text.
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in the early 1990s, early 2000s, and the past couple of years,
12
funding for indigent defense has been repeatedly slashed.
As United States Attorney General Eric Holder noted in early
2010:
[P]ublic defender programs are too many times underfunded. Too often, defenders carry huge caseloads that
make it difficult, if not impossible, for them to fulfill their
legal and ethical responsibilities to their clients. Lawyers
buried under these caseloads often can’t interview their
client properly, file appropriate motions, conduct fact
investigations, or spare the time needed to ask and apply
for additional grant funding. . . .
I continue to believe that if our fellow citizens knew
about the extent of this problem, they would be as
troubled as you and I. Public education about this issue is
critical. For when equal justice is denied, we all lose. . . .
Although they may stand on different sides of an
argument, the prosecution and the defense can, and
must, share the same objective: Not victory, but justice.
Otherwise, we are left to wonder if justice is truly being
done, and left to wonder if our faith in ourselves and in
our systems is misplaced.
But problems in our criminal defense system aren’t just
morally untenable.
They’re also economically
unsustainable.
Every taxpayer should be seriously
concerned about the systematic costs of inadequate
defense for the poor. When the justice system fails to get
it right the first time, we all pay, often for years, for new
filings, retrials, and appeals. Poor systems of defense do
not make economic sense.
13
So, where do we go from here?

12. See, e.g., Backus & Marcus, supra note 9, at n.38 (discussing the impact of a
sixteen percent reduction in public defense budgets in Oregon for 2001–03);
Spangenberg & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 13 (listing significant budget cuts in New
Jersey and Tennessee in 1991 and 1992); JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 7 (noting
the “country’s current financial crisis, which afflicts state and local governments
everywhere, is having severe adverse consequences for the funding of indigent
defense services, which already receives substantially less financial support
compared to prosecution and law enforcement.”); see also infra notes 86–106 and
accompanying text.
13. Eric H. Holder, Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice Nat'l Symposium on
Indigent Defense: Looking Back, Looking Forward, 2000–2010 (Feb. 18, 2010),
available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/topics/Speeches/Eric%20Holder
%20Remarks%20Indigent%20Defense%20Summit%202.18.10%201.pdf .
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This article attempts to answer that question.
Part I lays out the evolution of the constitutional right to a
lawyer provided at government expense. Although the courts have
been willing to expand the circumstances in which an indigent
defendant gets free legal representation, they have been reluctant
to define what “legal representation” entails. Furthermore, they
have deferred to state legislatures to define how legal services are
provided and the manner in which state governments fund these
services.
Part II examines how state legislatures have responded to the
lack of guidance by the courts. Part II.A. looks at the various ways
of delivering legal services to indigent defendants. Part II.B. notes
the various funding mechanisms used at the state and local levels to
pay for these services. Part II.C. examines caseloads and highlights
the fact that, despite the significant increase in spending on
indigent defense, state and local governments have failed in their
obligation to fully provide indigent defense.
Part III examines the history of indigent defense in Minnesota,
the financial problems experienced, and the attempts to generate
the revenue necessary to provide indigent defense. It also
examines how the legislature dealt with public defense during
budget crunches. Many of the strategies employed nationwide
have been used in Minnesota with little or no success. It is clear
that no matter what the intentions, the priority to fully fund
indigent defense does not exist.
Part IV lays out an alternative dedicated funding stream, which
would generate sufficient revenue in Minnesota to fully realize
Gideon’s mandate. At the same time, the dedicated revenue stream
would insulate indigent defense from budget cuts enacted during
times of economic crisis. This funding stream would rely upon a
tax on alcohol as a means to meet the mandate of adequate
indigent defense. The relationship between alcohol and crime is
examined, and much of the money allocated for the criminal
justice system would come from the people who often participate in
the criminal justice system.
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE INDIGENT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In 1932 the United States Supreme Court addressed the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to
14
counsel in Powell v. Alabama. In Powell, several African American
15
defendants were accused of raping two white girls. They were
indicted seven days after the alleged incident, and within six days of
16
indictment, began trial. Although it appears that members of the
local bar expressed a willingness to help in the representation of
the defendants, no investigation was conducted, and it appears the
17
defense was “pro forma [rather] than zealous and active.” The
trials for each of the defendants were each completed in less than a
single day, each of the defendants were convicted, and each
18
defendant was sentenced to death. As such, the Court concluded
19
that there was no meaningful representation in this case. After
examining the historical right to counsel in the original thirteen
states, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the right to
have an attorney appointed was “a logical corollary from the
20
constitutional right to be heard by counsel.” Furthermore, the
Court concluded that this obligation was imposed upon the states
by due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth
21
Amendment. However, at that time the Court limited the right to
14. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
15. Id. at 49.
16. Id. at 53.
17. Id. at 58.
18. Id. at 50.
19. Id. at 58 (noting that to conclude otherwise would be to ignore reality).
20. Id. at 72. In recognizing the need for representation, Justice Sutherland
noted:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.
If charged with [a] crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the
rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or
evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both
the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though
he [may] have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he [may]
be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not
know how to establish his innocence.
Id. at 68–69.
21. Id. at 71–72 (applying the obligation on states because “there are certain
immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government
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appointed counsel to capital cases where “the necessity of counsel
was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make
an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due
22
process . . . .”
In 1942, the United States Supreme Court was asked to extend
the constitutional guarantee of counsel to all felonies in Betts v.
23
Brady. In that case, the defendant, Mr. Betts, was charged with
24
robbery in the state of Maryland. Betts asked the court to appoint
a lawyer for him, but was instructed that the practice was to only
25
appoint lawyers in cases involving murder or rape. As a result,
Betts served as his own lawyer. He was convicted at trial and
26
sentenced to serve eight years in prison.
As in Powell, the Court in Betts examined the practice of the
states to determine the scope of the fundamental right to an
27
attorney. Specifically, the Court examined whether the right to
counsel meant access to counsel of one’s choice versus access to
28
counsel regardless of financial means. The Court concluded that,
in a majority of states, appointment of counsel is not a fundamental
29
right essential to a fair trial. As a result, the Court declined to
adopt a bright line rule requiring the appointment of counsel in all
30
cases.
Rather, in a six-three decision, the Court warned that
convictions arising out of cases where the defendant is
unrepresented may not stand if the trial “is offensive to the
which no member of the Union may disregard” (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169
U.S. 366, 389 (1898))).
22. Id. at 71. The Court specifically limited its ruling to
a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is
incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance,
feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court,
whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary
requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an
assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the
giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case.
Id.
23. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
24. Id. at 456.
25. Id. at 457.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 465–71.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 471.
30. Id. at 473. The Court specifically noted “we cannot say that the
[Fourteenth] [A]mendment embodies an inexorable command that no trial for
any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a
defendant who is not represented by counsel.” Id.
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31

common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right . . . .”
Twenty-one years later, the United States Supreme Court
32
revisited the issue in Gideon v. Wainright.
In that case, the
33
As in Betts, the
defendant was charged with felony burglary.
defendant, Mr. Gideon, asked the trial court to appoint him a
34
lawyer, and that request was denied. Gideon represented himself
35
at trial, was convicted, and was sentenced to five years in prison.
Justice Black, writing for the majority, noted:
[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.
This seems to us be to an obvious truth. Governments,
both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of
money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of
crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed
essential to protect the public’s interest in an orderly
society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with
crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they
can get to prepare and present their defenses. That
government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants
who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the
strongest indications of the wide-spread belief that lawyers
in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. . . . From

31. Id. Three justices dissented. Justice Black, writing for the dissent, noted,
“If this case had come to us from a federal court, it is clear we should have to
reverse it, because the Sixth Amendment makes the right to counsel in criminal
cases inviolable by the federal government. I believe that the Fourteenth
Amendment made the sixth applicable to the states.” Id. at 474 (Black, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted). He went on to note that:
A practice cannot be reconciled with "common and fundamental ideas of
fairness and right," which subjects innocent men to increased dangers of
conviction merely because of their poverty. Whether a man is innocent
cannot be determined from a trial in which, as here, denial of counsel
has made it impossible to conclude, with any satisfactory degree of
[certainty], that the defendant’s case was adequately presented.
Id. at 476. Noting that thirty-five states provide counsel in some form for capital
and serious noncapital cases, Justice Black concluded his dissent with his stated
belief that “no man shall be deprived of counsel merely because of his poverty.
Any other practice seems to me to defeat the promise of our democratic society to
provide equal justice under the law.” Id. at 477 (footnote omitted).
32. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
33. Id. at 336–37.
34. Id. at 337 (the noting that, under Florida law, indigent defendants only
received appointed counsel in capital cases, trial court apologetically denied Mr.
Gideon’s request).
35. Id.
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the very beginning, our state and national constitutions
and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and
substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before
impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal
before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the
poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers
36
without a lawyer to assist him.
37
As such, the United States Supreme Court overruled Betts and
held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is so fundamental
38
that the Fourteenth Amendment makes it obligatory on the states.
In the aftermath of Gideon, the Supreme Court continued to
review and expand the right to counsel to the point where if an
indigent defendant risks spending any time incarcerated, then he
39
or she is entitled to a lawyer. However, the Court has consistently
deferred the manner in which indigent services are provided and
40
funded to the individual state legislatures. When asked to require
increased resources for indigent defendants, the courts have
consistently held that funding is specifically the responsibility of the
41
legislature.
36. Id. at 344. Justice Black’s words proved to be prophetic. On remand, Mr.
Gideon was represented by a local attorney, who conducted extensive
investigation, effectively cross-examined the witnesses, and essentially established
that the state’s eyewitness was the likely culprit. The end result was that Mr.
Gideon was acquitted by a jury after an hour of deliberations. JUSTICE DENIED,
supra note 9, at 21 (citing ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 234–50 (1964)).
37. See id. at 342.
38. Id. at 345.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 3–7.
40. See, e.g., THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATE INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSIONS 1
(2006),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender
/downloads/state_indigentdefense_feb07.pdf [hereinafter STATE INDIGENT
DEFENSE COMMISSIONS] (noting that the Supreme Court has never ruled who is
responsible to establish and fund indigent defense, and as such the duty has been
met by the state, local governments, or a combination of both); JUSTICE DENIED,
supra note 9, at 5.
41. See Bill Meyer, Public Defender Offices Are in Crisis Nationwide,
CLEVELAND.COM (June 3, 2009, 7:02 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/nation
/index.ssf/2009/06/nationwide_public_defender_off.html (noting that an
appellate court in Florida overturned an order allowing public defenders to
decline to take new cases on the grounds that solutions are within the province of
the legislature and the lawsuit was “nothing more than a political question
masquerading as a lawsuit”); see also State v. Smith, 681 P.2d. 1374, 1381–84 (Ariz.
1984) (finding low-bid indigent defense contracts unconstitutional, but not
requiring an alternative means of providing indigent services or minimum costs
for future contracts); In Re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So.2d.
1130, 1138–39 (Fla. 1990) (recommending the Florida legislature provide
additional funds for criminal defense); State v. Citizen, 898 So.2d. 325, 338–39
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III. STATE RESPONSES TO GIDEON AND ITS PROGENY
A. The Delivery of Services to Indigent Defendants
Over the years, delivery of indigent defense has developed into
42
three categories: (1) public defender programs; (2) a contract
43
44
Each state was allowed to
system; and (3) assigned counsel.
develop its own system for the delivery of services, resulting in a
“‘crazy quilt’ in which the quality of representation depended not
only upon the state, but perhaps even, the county of the

(La. 2005) (noting that while the state had taken some actions in the twelve years
since the Peart decision, it was still not providing sufficient funds for indigent
defense, but ruling that the appropriate remedy was to put the criminal case on
hold rather than compel the state or the parish to provide additional funds); State
v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780, 783 (La. 1993) (holding that case loads in the New
Orleans indigent defense system were so high that clients were not provided
assistance of counsel as constitutionally required, but not requiring any
governmental agency to provide additional resources); Lavelle v. Justices in the
Hampden Super. Ct., 812 N.E.2d 895, 911 (Mass. 2004) (noting that the
Massachusetts legislature underfunded indigent defense, but declining to order
additional money, and instead ordering that cases against defendants would be
dismissed without prejudice if they did not receive an appointed lawyer within
forty-five days of being charged); Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996)
(upholding Minnesota’s funding mechanisms for indigent defense even though
the Fourth Judicial District’s public defender’s office was so understaffed that it
would need to increase its staff by fifty percent simply to meet state guidelines for
maximum caseloads); Quitman v. Mississippi, 910 So.2d 1032 (Miss. 2005)
(upholding lower court’s granting of summary judgment on the grounds that the
county did not establish that state law putting the burden on the county for the
funding of indigent defense created ineffective assistance of counsel, despite the
high case loads and lack of support resources available for the public defenders).
42. A public defender program is a program where full or part-time public
defenders provide legal services for a given location or jurisdiction. Robert L.
Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Toward a More Effective Right to Assistance of
Counsel: Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31,
36 (1995).
43. A contract system is one where a government entity enters into a contract
with individuals or firms to provide legal representation for indigent defendants.
Contracts can be fixed price contracts (a set fee to handle all cases during a set
time period) or fee-per-case contracts (payment of a set amount for each case
handled during the time period). Id. at 35–36.
44. Assigned counsel programs rely upon appointment of private lawyers to
individual cases. Attorneys may be assigned by judge on an ad hoc basis or by an
administrative body. Under either method, payment may be hourly or a set
amount, although there are often caps on payment. Id. at 32–34; ABA CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SECTION, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE
SERVICES 5-2 (3d ed. 1992), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards
/providingdefense.pdf.
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45

prosecution.” By 1983, public defender offices provided indigent
46
defense in just over one-third of the counties nationwide. Fiftytwo percent of the counties used assigned counsel programs, and
47
the balance relied upon contract systems.
By the early 1990s, assigned counsel remained the
predominant system for the delivery of indigent defense, although
there had been some increase at the county level in public
48
The primary change
defender offices and contract programs.
during this decade was the expansion of statewide indigent defense
49
programs. Statewide programs were responsible for some or all of
the following: developing policy, providing oversight of indigent
defense programs, integrating public defender programs,
developing caseload standards, and dispersing money for indigent
50
defense. By the early 1990s, more than half the states instituted
51
some form of statewide program.
The growth of statewide
programs continued in the following decade, and as of 2005, some
form of statewide body overseeing indigent defense existed in forty52
one states.

45.
46.

White, supra note 9, at 533.
Id. at 531–32 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
BULLETIN: CRIMINAL DEFENSE FOR THE POOR 1986, at 3 (1998)).
47. Id. at 531 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
BULLETIN: CRIMINAL DEFENSE FOR THE POOR 1986, at 3 (1998)).
48. Id. at 532 (citing Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 42, at 33).
49. See White, supra note 9, at 534–35.
50. STATE INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSIONS, supra note 40, at 16. For a more
detailed description of the responsibilities of statewide commissions, see id. at 18–
29.
51. White, supra note 9, at 532. These statewide programs either involved a
state public defender with authority for providing indigent defense statewide or a
statewide public defender system run by a commission instead of a public
defender. Id. (citing Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 42, at 37–38).
52. STATE INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSIONS, supra note 40, at 2. Nine states
added statewide bodies in the 1980s, five additional states added statewide bodies
in the 1990s, and seven states added statewide programs between 2000 and 2005.
Id. at 3. One state, Mississippi, did disband its statewide program one year after
creating it, partly because the legislature never provided any funding for the
program. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES FOR
INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN FISCAL YEAR 2005, 17 (2006) [hereinafter STATE AND
COUNTY EXPENDITURES IN 2005], available at www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid
/defender/downloads/FINAL_REPORT_FY_2005_Expenditure_Report.pdf.
In
addition, Tennessee created a limited statewide commission, dealing only with
post-conviction relief. Local public defenders are elected at the district court level
and operate without any state oversight. STATE INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSIONS,
supra note 40, at 2.
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Just as there is great variance from state to state regarding the
delivery of indigent defense services, there is also great variance
within the statewide indigent defense programs. Some variances
include supervisory authority, funding control, or a combination of
both, depending upon the specific wishes of each state’s legislature.
Eleven states have established statewide commissions that
administer statewide public defense systems, including both
53
supervision and funding.
Nine states have a statewide public
54
defender system without a commission.
Five states have a
statewide commission that finances the entirety of indigent
defense, but allows counties or regions to determine the method by
55
which legal services are provided.
Ten states have a statewide
commission which provides only a portion of the finances for
indigent defense, but the counties retain primary responsibility for
the delivery of legal services, as well as the remaining financial
56
responsibility. Finally, there are five states where the statewide
bodies have no statutory authority over local jurisdictions and the
53. STATE INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSIONS, supra note 40, at 6. These states
are: Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin. Id.
54. Id. These states are: Alaska, Delaware, Iowa, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. In these states, a chief
public defender is appointed by the governor and is personally responsible for the
oversight and administration of the state public defender system. Id.
55. Id. These states are: Massachusetts, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oregon, and Virginia. Id. However, even with these categories there are
significant variations. For example, in Massachusetts, there is a hybrid system
where cases are handled both by full time public defenders in regional offices and
approximately 2400 private attorneys who get appointed to individual cases. STATE
AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES IN 2005, supra note 52, at 15. All of these lawyers are
supervised by the statewide body. Id. In North Carolina, by contrast, individual
counties still determine the model for the delivery of services, with thirteen of the
state’s one hundred counties using a public defender system, while the remaining
counties rely upon either assigned counsel or contract defenders. Id. at 23.
56. STATE INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSIONS, supra note 40, at 7. These states
are: Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, and Texas. Id. The partial authority is often over a type of case.
For example, in Georgia, the state commission has authority over felony and
juvenile delinquency cases, but counties retain responsibility for misdemeanor
cases. Id. In Kansas, the state is responsible for felonies and appeals, and the
counties are responsible for misdemeanor and juvenile cases. Id. Partial
responsibility can also be divided by geographic location. For example, in
Oklahoma, the state authority covers the entire state, except for the two largest
counties, who have chosen to opt out of the state system. Id. at 7–8. In Nevada,
seven counties are covered by the state system, but the remaining nine, including
the two most populous, have opted out of the system and chosen to provided their
own systems, at their own costs, but without state oversight. Id. at 8.
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delivery of services, but try to exercise some control through the
administration of supplemental state funding for indigent
57
defense.
B. State and Local Funding for Indigent Defense
The effect of Gideon and its progeny is that the United States
Supreme Court has created an unfunded mandate that has fallen
58
on the shoulders of state and local governments. The result of
this constitutional mandate, without adequate funding, leaves
indigent defense overwhelmed and undermines the principle of
equal justice for all.

57. Id. These states are: Indiana, Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, and Texas. Id.
In all but Texas, compliance with the state authority is discretionary, but to get the
supplemental funding, local jurisdictions must agree to state standards. Id.
However, due to budget limitations, the state funding often amounts to only a
small portion of total expenses incurred for indigent defense. Id. For example, in
Louisiana, state funding amounted to only 29% of the total spent on indigent
defense. Id. at 9. In Nebraska, the original goal of 25% was never appropriated,
and in 2004, state spending was only 4% of the total spent on indigent defense. Id.
at 9–10. In Texas, state funding was 11% of the total costs. Id. Ohio, which once
provided almost half the total costs, saw its contributions drop below 30%. Id.
58. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 29–30 (citing Norman Leftsein, In Search
of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons from England and the Need for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS
L.J. 835, 843 (2004)). Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Argersinger,
raised concerns about the financial impact of expanding the right to counsel,
noting:
[T]he easiest solution would be a prophylactic rule that would require
the appointment of counsel to indigents in all criminal cases. The
simplicity of such a rule is appealing because it could be applied
automatically in every case, but the price of pursuing this easy course could be
high indeed in terms of its adverse impact on the administration of the criminal
justice systems.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 50–51 (1972) (emphasis added). Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, dismissed Justice Powell’s concern, indicating
that there were sufficient legal resources in the United States to meet the
expanded need for counsel. Id. at 37 n.7. Justice Douglas noted that it would take
between 1575 and 2300 full time lawyers to provide legal representation to the
expanded class of misdemeanor defendants, a small number of the estimated
355,200 lawyers practicing in the United States in 1972. Id. Justice Brennan, in a
concurring opinion, opined that law students in clinical programs would be able
to “make a significant contribution, quantitatively and qualitatively, to the
representation of the poor in many areas, including cases reached by today’s
decision.” Id. at 44. The only discussion about the financial cost being imposed
upon the states was by Justice Powell, who concluded his concurrence by noting
that courts and legislatures in individual states established limits for the
appointment of counsel, and that by extending the right to counsel to all
misdemeanors, the Court’s decision “may seriously overtax capabilities.” Id. at 60.
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By 1972, nine years after Gideon, and the year the right to
counsel was extended to misdemeanors, nationwide indigent
59
defense expenditures were estimated at $87 million annually. The
60
estimated expenditures grew to $200 million in 1976, and $436
61
62
million by 1980. By 2002, this total grew to $3.3 billion. By 2005,
it was estimated that county, state, and federal funding for indigent
63
defense was approximately $4.1 billion, with state governments
now assuming a majority of the financial responsibility for indigent
64
defense.
Although this seems like a tremendous amount of
money, it translates into approximately $11.72 per person in the
65
United States.
Currently, twenty-eight states essentially provide all the
66
funding for indigent defense. Four additional states provide a
67
Sixteen states require
majority of indigent defense funding.
68
counties to pay the majority, while two states provide no state

59. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 51.
County governments were
responsible for approximately $50 million of the total expenditures. Id. at 51 n.18
(citing SHELDON KRANTZ, ET AL., RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES: THE
MANDATE OF Argersinger v. Hamlin 5 (1976)) [hereinafter KRANTZ].
60. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 51 (citing NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER
ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES: REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION ON DEFENSE SERVICES 7 (1976)).
61. Id. (citing NORMAN LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR:
METHODS AND PROGRAMS FOR PROVIDING LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND THE NEED FOR
ADEQUATE FINANCING 10 (ABA 1982)).
62. STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES IN 2005, supra note 52, at 2.
63. Id. Of this total, $1.777 billion was paid by states, $1.684 billion was paid
by counties, and $668.8 million was paid by the federal government for indigent
defense in federal court. See id. at 34–37.
64. Id. at 37.
65. Lefstein, supra note 9, at 921. When expenditures for federal court were
removed, it amounts to less than $10 per capita. Id. at 922. By comparison, in
England, the per capita expenditure for indigent defense was almost $34 for the
same time period. Id. at 921. Only five states spent more than $15 per capita on
indigent defense, while twenty-nine spend less than $10 per capita. Id. at 922.
66. Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 54.
67. Kansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and South Carolina. Id.
68. Alabama, Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, and
Washington. Id. Of these, six states contributed less than ten percent of the total
funding—Arizona, California, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, and Washington.
STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES IN 2005, supra note 52, at 35–37.
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69

funding at all.
Just as there was a general movement toward
increased state oversight and administration of indigent defense
services, there has been a corresponding increase of state financial
70
responsibility.
Unfortunately, as states were assuming more responsibility for
indigent defense, there were competing demands for limited state
revenues. As such, states have turned to alternative revenue
sources to supplement general funds when allocating resources for
71
indigent defense.
These alternative sources have included
72
73
reimbursements, application fees, filing fees and court costs, and
74
various assessments on criminal files or fees.
Traditional reimbursement targeted defendants who were
considered “indigent” but also had the financial means to pay for
75
part of his or her legal defense. However, recovery often required
a significant amount of administrative resources to try and collect
76
from defendants upon completion of the case.
In the early 1990s, states were under both the pressure of
budget deficits and legal challenges to the underfunding of
indigent defense. In an attempt to get a higher rate of return,

69.

These states are Pennsylvania and Utah. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at

54.
70. Not only did states increase the amount they were contributing for
indigent defense, but the number of states which contributed nothing decreased
from ten in 1986 to two in 2005. Id. at 55; STATE INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSIONS,
supra note 40, at 31.
71. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 57.
72. Also called recoupment, it is usually collected at the end of the case,
and reflects the costs of the legal representative provided. THE SPANGENBERG
GROUP, PUBLIC DEFENDER APPLICATION FEES: 2001 UPDATE 2 (2002), available at
www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/
pdapplicationfees2001-narrative.pdf [hereinafter APPLICATION FEES].
73. Application fees are fees imposed at the onset of proceedings. Id. They
are also called “copayments,” “user fees,” “administrative fees,” or “registration
fees.” Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political Economy of Application Fees
for Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2045, 2052 (2006). Application
fees can generally be broken down into two categories: (1) fees applied statewide,
and (2) states where individual counties have the discretionary ability to impose
and collect the fees. See APPLICATION FEES, supra note 72, at 5.
74. Spangenberg & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 16.
75. Wright & Logan, supra note 7373, at 2046.
76. Id. Some recoupment programs spent more on administrative costs than
they were able to recover. See APPLICATION FEES, supra note 72, at 29 n.6. Contrast
this with Kentucky’s experience, which actually saw an increase in its recoupment
collections after the imposition of application fees, resulting in $1.8 million in
collections between the two sources for 2000. Id. at 10.
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many states supplemented reimbursement with application fees.
78
In 1994, application fees existed in only six states and one county.
By 1997, application fees were used by eleven states and seven
79
counties within a twelfth state. By 2006, application fees were
utilized by twenty-five states and two counties within a twenty-sixth
80
state. Fees ranged from $10 to $480 depending upon the state,
81
the charges, and the ability of the defendant to pay. However,
despite the expansion of application fees, the revenue collected
82
continued to fall far short of expectations.
77. Wright & Logan, supra note 73, at 2046. Copayments were often sought
by leadership in indigent defense organizations in an attempt to avert budget
problems. Id. at 2055. For example, a budget crisis in New Jersey in 1991 led
directly to the imposition of a $50 application fee for indigent defense.
APPLICATION FEES, supra note 72 , at 12. In New Mexico, application fees were
enacted at the request of the New Mexico State Public Defender in 1992. Id. at 13.
78. APPLICATION FEES, supra note 72, at 4.
79. Id.
80. Wright & Logan, supra note 73, at 2052. These included Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Vermont, Wisconsin, West Virginia, and King County and Pierce
County, Washington. Id. at 2052 n.20–21.
81. Id. at 2053. Florida is the only state which does not allow the waiver of an
application fee. See APPLICATION FEES, supra note 72, at 8. This is so despite the
United States Supreme Court ruling that imposing an application fee
unconstitutionally violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel if the
defendant is required to pay and the payment would create a manifest financial
hardship. See Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 53 (1974); see also State v. Tennin, 674
N.W.2d 403, 409–10 (Minn. 2004) (finding unconstitutional the same copayment
statute once the legislature amended it to remove the court’s ability to waive
copayments); State v. Cunningham, 663 N.W.2d 7, 12 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003)
(finding constitutional a copayment imposed by the court as long as the court had
the ability to waive it due to hardship).
82. See Wright & Logan, supra note 73, at 2070. Collection of application fees
ranged from only six to twenty percent. APPLICATION FEES, supra note 72, at 29. In
2001, only two states generated more than $1 million in application fees, and one
of those was Florida, which appears to be imposing and collecting fees in violation
of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. Indiana collected
almost $1.5 million in 2000 through a combination of both application fees and
recoupment. Id. at 9. Minnesota only generated $93,000 during the first three
months of its nonwaivable application fee, even through the program was
expected to generate $5 million each year. Amy Sherman, Defendants Squeezed for
Drug Tests, Probation Fees Are Part of Trend to Help Pay for Criminal Defense, PIONEER
PRESS (St. Paul, Minn.), Dec. 27, 2003, at B1. In South Carolina, an application
fee expected to raise $1.4 million annually starting in 1994 never generated
$200,000 in any given year. APPLICATION FEES, supra note 72, at 17–18. Although
Wisconsin estimated it would generate $7 million in application fees, through
2000 it had failed to collect $1 million in any year since its enactment. Id. at 20.
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An additional avenue of revenue explored by states was
surcharges on fines and other fees. For example, Kentucky began
83
assessing fees on DUI cases.
South Carolina began imposing
84
In Georgia, money was
assessments on top of criminal fines.
raised through fees on civil and criminal cases and surcharges on
85
bail. In New York, nearly half of the money spent on indigent
86
defense came from nongeneral fund sources. In Louisiana, the
overwhelming majority of money for indigent defense is generated
87
through fees associated by traffic fines. Capital cases and appeals
Connecticut failed to generate close to fifty percent of anticipated revenue. See id.
at 6. New Mexico hoped to earn as much as $200,000 annually, yet it was barely
earning half that in 2000. Id. at 13–14. In Santa Barbara, California, the public
defender fee was discontinued in 2001, in part because of the fact that the fee
failed to generate significant revenue. Id. at 22. Nationwide, in 2001 the rate of
collection for public defender fees was between six and twenty percent.
Whitehurst, supra note 10, at 6.
83. APPLICATION FEES, supra note 72, at 10. Of the $200 DUI assessment,
twenty-five percent of that collected went toward public defense. Id. In 1999, this
generated almost $1.17 million for statewide indigent defense. Id.
84. Id. at 17. South Carolina has a complicated formula for fines from
general court sessions, magistrates’ courts, and municipal courts. Assessments on
fines in each of these courts range from fifty-two to one hundred percent of the
fines, with a portion of the collected assessments (ranging from 11.38% of
magistrate assessments to 19.38% of municipal assessments) allocated for
statewide indigent defense. Id. In 2000, these assessments on fines generated
$5.67 million for indigent defense. Id. Other states acted along similar lines. For
example, in Ohio, counties are partially reimbursed by the state for indigent
defense. STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES IN 2005, supra note 52, at 25. The
reimbursement fund is supported primarily by assessments on criminal
convictions. Id. South Dakota also uses a portion of a surcharge on fines to
reimburse counties for a portion of the costs of indigent defense. Id. at 28.
85. STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES IN 2005, supra note 52, at 10. These fees
included civil filing fees as well as surcharges on fines and bonds. Id. All of the
fees were specifically earmarked for indigent defense. Id. However, the additional
assessments, started in 2004, were insufficient in covering Georgia’s costs. JUSTICE
DENIED, supra note 9, at 57. Money was diverted from the collection, so that in
2009, indigent defense was only appropriated $40 million, even though $45
million was raised in 2008 from the various fees. Id. at 58. From 2005 through
2009, indigent defense in Georgia was shortchanged more than $20 million from
collections initially earmarked for indigent defense. See Bill Rankin, Georgia’s
Public Defender System May Go Back Under County Control, THE ATLANTA J-CONST., Apr.
6, 2010, http://www.ajc.com/news/georgia-politics-elections/georgias-public
-defender-system-440964.html.
86. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 58–59. These alternative sources of
income included fees for criminal history checks, lifting license suspensions,
surcharges on parking tickets, and additional attorney registration fees. Id. at 59
n.59.
87. Backus & Marcus, supra note 9, at 1050; JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at
58. Unfortunately, in Louisiana the state provides less than twenty percent of the
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88

in Mississippi are funded through assessments on criminal cases,
while all other cases are funded at the county level by fines in
89
criminal cases. In Arizona, virtually all of the funding for indigent
defense is provided by the county through various assessments and
90
fees. Pennsylvania and Utah are the only states where indigent
91
defense is funded entirely by the counties.
Despite the increase in both sources of revenue and total
revenue, indigent defense budgets have continued to be cut during
92
times of economic downturns. The pattern has held true during
three major downturns in the past twenty years: early 1990s, early
93
2000s, and 2008 to present.
Faced with budget deficits, some states started reducing public
94
defense budgets in the early 1990s.
In Kentucky, funding was
95
reduced at the state level by over five percent. Similarly, spending
96
for public defense in Tennessee was reduced by 5.3%. Tennessee
attempted to deal with the budget reductions by reducing hourly

financial assistance to indigent defense. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 58.
Although a significant amount of money is raised at the parish level, the lack of
state contributions left parishes financially vulnerable. Some jurisdictions found
themselves without the money to pay for attorney’s fees. See State v. Citizen, 898
So.2d 325, 338 (La. 2005) (noting that it is appropriate for the trial court to halt
prosecution when there is insufficient funds to guarantee payment for the defense
in a capital murder case); Backus & Marcus, supra note 9 at 1050 (discussing the
negative balance for Lake Charles with six capital murder cases still outstanding).
88. STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES IN 2005, supra note 52, at 17. The
assessments are on all criminal cases, including traffic tickets, fish and game
violations, as well as traditional felonies and misdemeanors. See id. at 18.
89. Id. at 17. There is no tracking of money put into the general funds of
each county, so it is impossible to track whether the fines collected at the local
level are actually spent on indigent defense. Id. at 18.
90. Id. at 5. These assessments were on both criminal and civil cases,
including traffic violations. Id. In addition, there was a surcharge on filing fees
and an additional assessment on court fees. Id. Like Arizona, Nebraska and
Washington are states that also relied upon surcharges and court fees to generate
revenue for indigent defense. Id. at 20, 32.
91. Id. at 27, 30. Funding is left to each county to decide how to pay for
indigent defense. Id.
92. See infra notes 96–116 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 96–116 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.
95. Richard Klein, The Eleventh Amendment: Thou Shall Not be Compelled to
Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363, 363 n.1 (1993) (citing
William R. Jones, Defense of Poor Crisis Needs Funding Help, THE ADVOC., Apr. 1992, at
3).
96. Id. (citing John B. Arango, Tennessee Indigent Defense System in Crises, CRIM.
JUST., Spring 1992, at 42).
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97

remission for indigent defense to $5–$7.50 per hour.
Kansas
reduced by twelve percent the amount it would pay appointed
98
lawyers for expenses and fees for indigent defense.
In the early 2000s, indigent defense budgets were once again
under siege by state legislatures. Funding for indigent defense in
99
several states fell. In Alabama, costs for indigent defense rose
100
In
while budget cuts ranged from ten to eighteen percent.
Georgia, statewide reform was enacted, but only $8.3 million in
funding was provided even though the system required $50–$70
101
million more to satisfy the mandated reform.
In Kentucky,
budget problems also gutted attempts at reform, leaving the
102
indigent defense system woefully understaffed.
In New Orleans,
thirty-four of the forty-one public defenders were laid off in the
103
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
From 2008 to 2010, states budgets were once again in dire
104
financial straits.
As a result, states and counties once again cut
funding for indigent defense. In Florida, many county public
defender offices reduced positions and even transferred costs to

97. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, KEEPING DEFENDER WORKLOADS MANAGEABLE
17 (2001), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/185632.pdf, [hereinafter
DEFENDER WORKLOADS].
98. Klein, supra note 95, at 372.
99. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 59. These states included Connecticut,
Hawaii, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon, and Wisconsin. In Oregon, $10.1 million
was cut from the statewide Indigent Defense Account. Lefstein, supra note 9, at
856. As a result, only the most serious crimes were prosecuted during the last
three months of 2003 because of dramatic cuts in the indigent defense budget.
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 9, at 11.
100. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 9, at 11.
101. Kyung M. Lee, Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders,
Indigent Defendants, and the Right to Counsel, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 402 (2004)
(citing Bill Rankin, Indigent Defense Gets Force But Needs Funds, THE ATLANTA
J.CONST., May 23, 2003, at F1).
102.
For example, heavy Kentucky caseloads led a panel of Kentucky state
leaders to recommend hiring thirty-five additional lawyers; however, due to
significant budget problems, that number was first reduced to ten additional
lawyers, and then ultimately reduced to five additional lawyers—a whole thirty
lawyers short of the original recommendation. Lee, supra note 101, at 376 (citing
John Cheves, Big Caseloads Swamp Public Defenders, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER
(Nov. 24, 2002), http://www.uky.edu/SocialWork/courses/sw571-001/CaseloadsSwamp-Defenders.pdf).
103. David Winkler-Schmit, The Life of a New Orleans Public Defender, GAMBIT, (Feb.
21, 2009), http://www.bestofneworleans.com/gyrobase/Content?oid=oid%3A51258.
104. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 59. For fiscal year 2009, thirty-seven states
were looking at budget shortfalls, and of these thirty-seven, twenty-two fully funded
their own indigent defense department. Id.
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defendants by requiring those convicted to pay a nominal fee or
105
In Kentucky, the state budget was
outright rejecting cases.
106
reduced by $2.3 million.
In Georgia, forty-one employees were
107
laid off, and bills for contracted lawyers went unpaid. Successive
budget cuts in the state of Maryland resulted in a reduction of ten
108
percent of the workforce.
In 2008, city and state contributions
109
for indigent defense in New York City fell by $2.7 million.

105. Id. at 60. In Orange-Osceola County, budget reductions of $3 million
resulted in the loss of ten attorney positions and forty positions over all. Id. In
Miami-Dade County, the public defenders budget was reduced by 12.6%, but the
workload climbed by twenty-nine percent. Erik Eckhold, Citing Workload, Public
Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/09/us/09defender.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1&hp.
106. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 60. Due to budget cuts, public defenders
stopped handling conflict cases, some misdemeanors, and even probation and
parole violations. Id. (citation omitted). The future does not look any brighter,
and the Kentucky governor’s proposed budget calls for a $400,000 cut for fiscal
year 2011, and another $400,000 in cuts for fiscal year 2012. Ronnie Ellis, Public
Defenders, KSP Plead for State Funding, MCCREARY CNTY. RECORD (Feb. 3, 2010),
available at http://mccrearyrecord.com/statenews/x1512273178/Public-defenders
-KSP-plead-for-state-funding.
107. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 60. In addition, the state of Georgia was
unable to pay lawyers hundreds of thousands of dollars owed them for indigent
defense in capital cases. Id. The reductions in Georgia’s state funding resulted in
the dismantling of parts of the statewide public defender system created just five
years previously. Brenda Goodman, Plan to Cut Back Public Defenders Stirs Worry in
Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06
/10/us/10defenders.html.
108. PAUL DEWOLFE, MD. PUB. DEFENDER, ADDRESS TO THE HOUSE
APPROPRIATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY AND ADMINISTRATION 3 (2010),
available at http://www.dbm.maryland.gov/agencies/operbudget/Documents
/2011/BudgetTestimony/C80B00_OfficePublicDefender.pdf.
The reductions,
from 2007–10, constituted one hundred positions, including twenty-nine attorney
positions. Id. at 7. In addition, during this three year time period, the lawyers
were subject to mandatory furloughs. Id. Such furloughs reduced the amount of
time each lawyer worked during the year, further increasing caseload pressures,
and placing lawyers in the impossible bind of working for free or neglecting the
needs of their clients. Id.
109. Eckhold, supra note 105, at A1. At the same time, the number of cases
handled grew by 16,000. Id. On top of these cuts, there was an expected
additional $11.3 million shortfall for the 2010 fiscal year. John Eligon, State Law to
Cap Public Defenders’ Caseloads, but Only in the City, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2009, at A19,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/06/nyregion/06defenders.html
?scp=1&sq=public%20defender%20caseloads&st=cse. The 2011 New York City
budget anticipates a drop of $20.1 million in city funding for indigent defense.
LEGAL AID/INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., COMM. ON FIN. & COMM. ON FIRE AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SERVS. 2 (2010), available at http://council.nyc.gov/html/budget/PDFs
/legal_aid_exec_rpt_fy_2011.pdf.
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In 2009, the Montana Public Defender’s Office budget was cut
110
In California, budget cuts and layoffs occurred in
by $800,000.
111
multiple counties. Meanwhile, Oregon was looking at a repeat of
its 2003 crisis, facing the prospect of a 6.6% budget reduction in
112
Louisiana’s statewide indigent defense budget was cut by
2009.
$1.4 million in 2009 and is facing an additional $7 million in state
113
cuts for the upcoming budget. Oklahoma lost 7.5% of its budget
114
in 2010, and is facing an additional 10% cut in 2011. Wisconsin
115
was looking at a $2 million reduction from 2009 to 2011.
C. Translating Funding into Caseloads
As discussed above, there has been a dramatic increase in
funding for indigent defense, increasing twenty fold from 1976 to
116
2005. Doesn’t this demonstrate that state and local governments
have fulfilled their financial obligations created by Gideon and its

110. Jennifer McKee, Office of Public Defender Underfunded Already, HELENA
INDEP. REC. (Feb. 3, 2010), available at http://www.helenair.com/news/local
/govt-and-politics/article_fff78c74-1093-11df-a76a-001cc4c002e0.html. The office
was looking at an additional reduction of five percent of its budget, or $990,951 in
2010 as the state legislature attempted to deal with its budget shortfall. Id.
111. For example, the Sacramento County public defender’s office laid off
eighteen staffers and was looking at laying off an additional twenty-nine attorneys
due to budget problems in 2009. Public Defenders Face Layoffs Across USA, USA
TODAY (June 15, 2009), available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation
/2009-06-15-lawyers-poor-layoffs_N.htm. At the same time, the San Francisco
public defender’s office was fighting to stave off a $2 million budget cut which
would result in firing fifteen to twenty attorneys. Id.
112. Jake Thomas, Lacking Lawyers: State Budget Cuts Threaten Public Defenders,
PORTLAND MERCURY, Feb. 5, 2009, available at http://www.portlandmercury.com
/portland/lacking-lawyers/Content?oid=1106650 (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
113. Winkler-Schmit, supra note 103. In New Orleans, the city council cut
additional allocations for public defense by $500,000, on top of state cuts, even
though the number of charges filed had increased by over 1000 from the previous
year. Laura Maggi, N.O. Public Defenders Office Says It Will Refuse New Murder and
Rape Cases Due to Council Budget Cuts, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Dec. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2009/12/orleans_parish_public_defender
.html.
114. Julie Bisbee, Oklahoma Indigent Defense System Struggles to Survive Cuts,
NEWSOK, Apr. 14, 2010, available at http://www.newsok.com/indigent-defense-system
-struggles-to-survive-cuts/article/3453740.
115. WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, PUBLIC DEFENDER BUDGET (2009–11),
available at www.legis.state.wi.us/lfb/2009-11Budget/Governor/spd.pdf.
The
numbers break down to a $618,000 reduction for 2009–10 and a $1.25 million
reduction for 2010–11. Id.
116. See supra notes 56–61 and accompanying text.
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117

progeny? In short, no. The measure is not the total amount of
money spent, but rather whether the amount of money spent
ensures that every indigent defendant receives adequate legal
118
counsel.
Some form of caseload or workload measure is
119
appropriate.

117. Several factors contributed to the dramatic increase in cases where
government lawyers needed to be provided for indigent defendants. Some of
these factors included: (1) increases in the crime rate and number of cases filed,
in particular drug related cases; (2) changes in economics, resulting in increased
rates of people claiming to be indigent; (3) increases in the percentage of serious
felony cases; and (4) changes in sentencing policies including mandatory
sentences. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, WEIGHTED CASELOAD STUDY FOR THE STATE
OF MINNESOTA BOARD OF PUBLIC DEFENSE 5–6 (1991) (draft report) [hereinafter
WEIGHTED CASELOAD STUDY], available at www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2009/mandated
/090611.pdf. It is estimated that as much as eighty percent of all criminal
defendants receive the services of government lawyers. Whitehurst, supra note 10,
at 1 (citing William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 443, 452 (1997)).
118. The standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court is that a
lawyer must provide a reasonable standard of care “under prevailing professional
norms.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). To that end, the
Court pointed to standards articulated by the American Bar Association as a guide
to what was reasonable. Id.
According to the American Bar Association, any system must provide “effect[ive],
efficient, high quality, ethical, conflict-free legal representation for criminal
defendants who are unable to afford an attorney.” A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON
LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENDER DELIVERY
SYSTEM (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads
/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbooklet.pdf. Principle 5 specifically states
“[d]efense counsel’s workload is controlled to permit the rendering of quality
representation.” Id. at 2. To that end, a lawyer’s caseload “should never be so
large as to interfere with the rendering of quality representation or lead to the
breach of ethical obligations . . . . National caseload standards should in no event
be exceeded.” Id. Furthermore, while there has been considerable emphasis on
building public defense programs, there has been no analysis about whether the
public defenders can handle the caseload. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC DEFENSE REFORM SINCE GIDEON: IMPROVING THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE BY BUILDING ON OUR SUCCESSES AND LEARNING FROM
OUR FAILURES 18 (2008), available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pdf/NLADA
_PubDefLeadership.pdf.
119. DEFENDER WORKLOADS, supra note 97, at 7. Although caseloads are
important for establishing a standard, they cannot be looked at in a vacuum.
Support staff, training, and supervision all are things which need to be considered,
as well as caseloads when determining whether each individual attorney has the
time and resources necessary to meet the needs of each client. Id.
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The first attempt to establish caseload maximums was in 1973,
by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice and
120
Goals (NAC). At that time the NAC determined that even under
the best conditions, annual criminal defense attorney caseloads
should not exceed the following: one hundred fifty felonies per
year; four hundred misdemeanors per year; or two hundred
121
juvenile cases per year.
These standards were the maximum an
attorney should handle if the attorney was doing only cases in one
122
category. In the decades that followed, individual states tinkered
123
although most of the standards
with caseload maximums,
124
established roughly mirror those established by the NAC.

120.

Id. at 8 (citing NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
REPORT ON COURTS (1973)).
121. Id. at 8 (quoting NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
AND GOALS, REPORT ON COURTS 186 (1973)). There are obvious limitations with
establishing caseload maximums by category. In addition to the issues of support
staff, training, and supervision, there are also issues about waiting or travel time,
professional development responsibilities, and the variance in time needed for
various types of crimes within each category (for example, a simple theft case is
treated no differently than a complicated murder or child sex abuse case). Id.
122. Id. at 10.
123. Id. at 10–13. Some states have established caseload maximums by statute.
For example, Wisconsin has a specific maximum annual caseload spelled out by
law. Id. at 13–14 (citing WIS. STAT. § 977.08(5)(bn) (1999)). Other states have
statutory language calling for the creation of maximums, but defer either to the
statewide public defender program (New Hampshire) or counties or cities
(Washington State) to establish maximums. Id. at 13 (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 604-B:6 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.101.030 (1999)). Other sources of
caseload maximums include: “court rule, contractual terms, court opinion, and
published guidelines by national organizations.” Id. at 7. In addition, several
statewide public defender organizations have established caseload maximums
based upon case weighted studies done to reflect the particularized circumstances
in that state. Id. at 8–9.
124. See id. at 11–12 for a comprehensive list of standards established relating
to maximum caseloads for felonies, misdemeanors, juvenile cases, and appeals.
For felonies, the standard maximums range from forty in Missouri to 302 in
Tennessee, although both Missouri and Tennessee differentiate between the
severity of the class of felonies. Id. In Minnesota, there is a cap of three homicides
per year, but no distinction between all other types of felonies. Id. at 12 n.4. For
misdemeanors, the range is a maximum of 250 per year in Minnesota (for gross
misdemeanors, punishable by up to one year in jail) to 598 misdemeanors per year
in Colorado (for nontraffic misdemeanors). Id. at 11–12. For juvenile cases, the
range is 175 juvenile cases per year in Minnesota to 480 juvenile cases per year in
Oregon. Id. Indiana has one set of standards based upon sufficient support staff
and a lower maximum if support standards are not met. Id. at 10. If sufficient
support staff exist, the standards are 200 felonies, 450 misdemeanors, 250 juvenile
cases, or twenty-five appeals. Id. at 11. However, if there are not sufficient support
staff, those maximums are lowered to 100–150 felonies, 300 misdemeanors, 200
AND GOALS,
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Unfortunately, many of these established standards were ignored,
and attorneys handled caseloads significantly higher than
125
established ceilings.
Despite the significant increase in spending for indigent
126
For
defense, caseload levels remain at dangerously high levels.
example, in 1991, public defenders in Knox County, Tennessee
127
had caseloads as high as five times the national standards.
In
1992, public defenders in Dade County, Florida, were handling
128
double the recommended number of juvenile cases. Meanwhile,
in Connecticut, public defender caseloads were almost three times
129
The average
the recommended maximums in 1993 and 1994.
130
caseload in Orange County, California in 1995 was 610 cases.

juvenile cases, or twenty appeals. Id. at 10. The ratio of necessary support staff
included one paralegal for every four attorneys handling felony or juvenile cases
(1:5 for misdemeanors), one investigator for every four attorneys handling
felonies (1:6 for misdemeanors and juvenile cases), and one secretary for every
four attorneys handling felonies (1:6 for misdemeanors, and 1:5 for juvenile
cases). Id.
125. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 67. For example, even though the State
of Washington had legislation requiring caseload maximums, many jurisdictions
had caseloads far exceeding the established standards. Lefstein, supra note 9, at
854 (quoting MICHAEL S. SPEARMAN, REMARKS AT A HEARING ON LEGAL AID AND
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS: ARE WE KEEPING THE PROMISE? THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 40
YEARS AFTER GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT (2003), available at http://www.nacdl.org
/public.nsf/GideonAnniversary/Index1/$FILE/Spearman_comments.pdf).
126. See Klein, supra note 95, at 393. According to studies through the 1990s
there was “an unmistakable trend showing that ‘caseloads of most public
defenders [had] grown at an alarming rate.’” Id.; SCOTT WALLACE & DAVID
CARROLL, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, THE IMPLEMENTATION & IMPACT OF
INDIGENT DEFENSE STANDARDS 5 (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles1/nij/grants/205023.pdf (noting that a survey of the one hundred largest
counties in the United States indicated that average caseloads were over 530 cases
annually, with some attorneys handling as many as 2000 adult cases or 1400
juvenile cases in one year).
127. DEFENDER WORKLOADS, supra note 97, at 17. Additional funds were
obtained in 1992, almost doubling the size of the office. Id. However, in the years
that followed, funding did not keep up, and by 1999 it was determined that fiftynine additional attorneys were needed statewide simply to reduce caseloads to the
maximum recommended level. Id. at 18.
128. Id. at 19.
129. Id. at 22. Adult criminal lawyers were handling on average 1,045
combined misdemeanors and lesser felonies, and juvenile criminal lawyers were
handling 716 cases each per year. Id.
130. See Kyung M. Lee, Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders,
Indigent Defendants, and the Right to Counsel, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 377 (2004).
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In the early 2000s, with budgets being reduced, caseloads once
131
again soared to ridiculously high levels. For example, lawyers in
Clark County, Nevada handled approximately 1500 juvenile cases
132
each, about seven times the NAC recommended limit.
In
Kentucky, caseload averages rose to 489 cases per lawyer, with many
jurisdictions averaging between 500–600, and one jurisdiction
133
averaging over 600 cases per year.
Some parishes in Louisiana
had caseload averages four to six times the recommended
134
maximum.
Some attorneys in the state of New York were
135
handling between 1000 and 1600 cases annually. In Pennsylvania,
a public defender’s office caseload doubled over twenty years
136
without any increase in attorneys.
Maryland public defender
offices were so understaffed that by 2002, 300 full time lawyers were
137
needed to reduce caseloads to the maximum levels.

131. See Backus & Marcus, supra note 9, at 1055–59.
132. Id. at 1055.
133. Id. at 1057. Rhode Island had similar numbers, with felony caseloads
almost forty percent higher than the established maximums and misdemeanors
150% higher. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 9, at 18. Similarly, caseloads
in Tennessee were at 670 cases in 1999, and the additional funding recommended
to bring the state into compliance with caseload maximums was never allocated.
White, supra note 9, at 537.
134. Backus & Marcus, supra note 9, at 1058–59 (citing Editorial, Don’t Allow
Justice to Derail, THE SHREVEPORT TIMES, May 8, 2005, at 6I; Elizabeth Fitch, Indigent
Defenders Overloaded, Underfunded, NEWS-STAR (Monroe, La), May 5, 2005, at A1).
135. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 9, at 17. Nebraska public defenders
had similar experiences, handling 1200 cases, including felonies, misdemeanors,
child support contempt cases, and juvenile cases. Id. at 18. In Berrien County,
Michigan, six lawyers handled a total of 4479 felony and misdemeanor cases, with
one lawyer handling 700 misdemeanors, 300 felonies, and 200 private cases on the
side. Duncan v. Michigan, 774 N.W.2d 89, 135 n.21 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009). In
Muskegon County, Michigan, one lawyer reportedly handled 700 felony cases per
year. Id.
136. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 9, at 18.
137. Lefstein, supra note 9, at 855. The Maryland public defender’s office had
not had an increase in the number of attorneys for five years, despite dramatic
caseload increases. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

25

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 19

584

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:2

Not surprisingly, the budget crises in the late 2000s resulted in
138
skyrocketing caseloads. In one county in Tennessee, six lawyers
139
handled 10,000 misdemeanors in a one year period.
In
Kentucky, lawyers who were already operating forty percent above
maximum caseloads and experiencing an eight percent annual
increase in cases, were told by the legislature to expect budget
140
decreases in upcoming years.
In Dade County, Florida, budget
cuts resulted in felony lawyers handling 500 cases per year, and
141
misdemeanor attorneys handling 2225 annually, while in Dallas
County, Texas, misdemeanor lawyers are expected to handle 1200
cases while felony attorneys are expected to do 480 felonies
142
annually.
Average caseloads for Rhode Island were 1517

138. See Jeff Adachi, Budget Cuts Threaten Promise of Equal Justice, THE RECORDER
(San Francisco), (Feb. 13, 2009), available at www.sfpublicdefender.org/media
/2009/04/budget-cuts-threaten-promise-of-equal-justice (noting that public
defenders in Arizona, Florida, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Maryland, and
Tennessee all refused to accept new cases or sued to reduce excessive caseloads as
budgets were reduced). In some larger cities, notably Chicago, Atlanta, and
Miami, some public defenders reported handling caseloads in excess of 2000
misdemeanors annually. ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA N. BRINK & MAUREEN
DIMINO, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN
MISDEMEANOR COURTS 9 (2009) [hereinafter MINOR CRIMES], available at
www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/misdemeanor/$FILE/Report.pdf.
139. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 68. One attorney reported having open
240 cases, of which 144 were felonies, while another lawyer reported representing
151 clients in the months of January and February of 2008. Id. Two attorneys
reported handling 3000 misdemeanors during a one year period. MINOR CRIMES,
supra note 138, at 21.
140. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 68; see Statement to the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Justice, Science & Related Agencies, of the U.S. Comm. on Appropriations,
111th Cong. 1–2 (2010) (statement of Virginia Sloan, President, The Constitution
Project), available at www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/389.pdf (noting
that despite the insufficient expenditure per case and high average number of
cases, Kentucky’s Governor proposes reducing the Department’s budget).
141. Eckholm, supra note 105, at A1. Although a district court judge initially
granted the public defender’s request to refuse to take defendants charged with
less serious felonies, an appellate court reversed the decision, instead referring the
problem to the legislature. See Bill Meyer, Public Defender Offices Are in Crisis
Nationwide, CLEVELAND.COM (June 3, 2009), www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf
/2009/06/nationwide_public_defender_off.html. Unfortunately, the legislative
response repeatedly has been that indigent defense needs to learn how to better
use its limited resources. Eckholm, supra note 105, at A1..
142. WESLEY SHACKELFORD, REVIEW OF DALLAS COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER:
APPELLATE DIVISION AND CASELOAD STANDARDS 7 (2008), available at
http://www.courts.state.tx.us/tfid/pdf/Dallas%20PD%20Report-%20FINAL.pdf.
These caseloads were established to insure that public defenders “remain cost
effective vis-a-vis the private assigned counsel.” Id. at 17. The research indicated
that the caseload caps were significantly higher than necessary to ensure “cost
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143

misdemeanors and 239 felonies annually.
In Missouri, cases
increased statewide by 12,000 over an eight year period, and yet
144
staff numbers remained unchanged.
In New York City, the
average indigent Legal Aid Society lawyer handled almost 600
145
cases in 2008.
Despite the significant increase in spending on indigent
defense, overall the systems for providing indigent defense are
146
inadequate.
These problems are exacerbated when states face
budget deficits.
So the question becomes: how can the
constitutional right to counsel be insulated from the competing
demands experienced by state and local governments during times
of budget shortfalls?
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN MINNESOTA
In response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Gideon, the Minnesota legislature passed the Public Defender Act in
147
1965.
The Public Defender Act allowed judges in each of the
148
judicial districts to vote on establishing a public defender system.
However, the funding for indigent defense was the responsibility of
149
individual counties, and was financed from property tax revenues.
effectiveness,” with public defender costs per misdemeanor at approximately half
that of private assigned counsel and about eighty percent of the cost of assigned
counsel on felony cases. See id.
143. Talia Buford, R.I. Public Defender Looks to Lighten Load, THE PROVIDENCE J.
(Apr. 20, 2009), available at www.projo.com/news/content/PUBLIC_DEFENDER
_REFUSES_CASES_04-20-09_HMDUF3_v38.35d5d5b.html.
144. Eckholm, supra note 105, at A1.
145. See Eligon, supra note 109, at A19. While a new law would establish
caseload maximums for New York City, it does nothing for other parts of the state
of New York. “While the law applies only to lawyers who represent indigent
defendants in New York City, supporters say they hope the guidelines will be
expanded.” Id. The caseload maximums do not go into effect until 2010. Id.
146. See Lefstein, supra note 9, at 845 (discussing the findings of the
Department of Justice’s national symposia on indigent defense in 1999 and 2000).
England spends more than three times as much per capita as the United States on
indigent defense. Id. at 921–23.
147. MINN. STAT. § 611.14–29 (2009).
148. JAIME BAILEY & MAREA BEEMAN, THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, CASE STUDIES OF
TWO INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS: MINNESOTA AND WYOMING 8 (2001) [hereinafter
TWO INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS], available at www.abanet.org/legalservices
/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/mn-wystudies.pdf;
WEIGHTED
CASELOAD
STUDY, supra note 117, at 1. Hennepin County and Ramsey County already had
public defender systems in place prior to 1965. TWO INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS,
supra note 148, at 8.
149. Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1996).
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150

Consistent with national trends, in the early 1980s, Minnesota
151
In 1981, a State Board of
began to shift to a statewide system.
152
Public Defense (the Board) was created.
In 1987, the Board’s
153
authorities were expanded, and in 1989 public defenders in the
statewide system became responsible for all felony and gross
154
misdemeanor representation throughout the state.
In 1995, the
state took over the responsibility for the funding and delivery of all
155
Finally, as of January 1, 1999, the two
indigent defense.
156
metropolitan counties were folded into the statewide system, and
public defenders became the primary providers of indigent defense
157
statewide.

150. OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, EVALUATION REPORT: PUBLIC
DEFENDER SYSTEM 9 (2010) [hereinafter PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM], available at
http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/PED/pedrep/pubdef.pdf.
151. Id. at 10 (“About 20 years ago, Minnesota state government assumed
responsibility for public defender services, shifting from a patchwork of local
public defense systems.”).
152. Id. at 9. The Board’s responsibility was primarily the appointment of the
State Public Defender and the Chief Public Defenders in Minnesota’s ten judicial
districts. Id. at 10.
153. Among the responsibilities added to the Board in 1987 was the
establishment of public defender caseload standards. WEIGHTED CASELOAD STUDY,
supra note 117, at 1–2.
154. TWO INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, supra note 148, at 8. Among the changes
in 1989 was the allocation of approximately $17 million for representation of all
felonies and gross misdemeanors while misdemeanors, juveniles, and other cases
remained the responsibility of the counties. WEIGHTED CASELOAD STUDY, supra
note 117, at 3.
155. TWO INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, supra note 148, at 8. Under Minnesota
law, public defenders shall provide services to those financially unable to obtain
counsel for the following cases: felonies, gross misdemeanors, misdemeanors;
appeals from convictions of felonies or gross misdemeanors or minors ten years of
age or older entitled to counsel. Id. at 8–9. For juveniles, this includes anyone
charged by delinquency petition with the commission of a felony or gross
misdemeanor or charged with being delinquent and facing a potential out-ofhome placement. MINN. STAT. § 260B.163, subdiv. 4 (2008). It also includes
children over ten in child protection cases where out-of-home placement may be
ordered. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subdiv. 3 (2008). In addition, public defenders
represented parents on child protection cases until 2008. See MN to Lose 72 Public
Defenders to Budget Cuts, WCCO.COM (June 5, 2008) (on file with author); see also
infra note 194 and accompanying text.
156. MINN. STAT. § 611.263 (1999). Prior to 1999, public defenders in the
Fourth Judicial District (Hennepin County) and Second Judicial District (Ramsey
County) were county employees, while all the remaining public defenders were
state employees.
157. The State Board of Public Defense provides some funding for four
nonprofit public defense corporations which provide services to minority indigents
in Minneapolis, St. Paul, Duluth, and the Leech Lake and White Earth Reservations.
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When the state assumed responsibility for organizing indigent
defense and providing services, it also took on the financial
158
responsibility for indigent defense.
From approximately $17
159
million in 1989, state appropriations grew to almost $22 million
160
161
This number grew to $35 million in 1997, and $53.8
in 1995.
162
million in 2003. For the next two years, state allocations dropped
163
Appropriations then
slightly, by approximately $200,000.
increased again over the next several years, peaking at $68 million
164
in 2009 before being reduced to $65.4 million in 2010. The
PUB. DEF. BOARD, AGENCY PROFILE 1 (2008), available at http://www.leg.state.mn.us
/docs/2008/other/081000/public_defense.pdf.
158. Hennepin County continued to contribute for some of the costs of public
defense, providing almost $2.7 million in 1994. Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d
1, 4 (Minn. 1996).
159. WEIGHTED CASELOAD STUDY, supra note 117, at 3.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. E-mail from Kevin Kajer, Chief Administrator, State Board of Public
Defense, to author, attachment 1 (June 9, 2010, 15:44 CST) (on file with author).
The legislature initially cut allocations to public defense by $3.4 million in FY
2003. PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 150, at 32. As a result of the budget
reductions, twenty positions were eliminated through retirement or layoffs. Id. at
33.
163. E-mail from Kevin Kajer to author, supra note 162, attachment 1.
164. Id. The initial recommendation by the governor was for a $5.1 million
cut. Scott Russell, Public Defenders: A Weakened But Indispensable Link, BENCH AND B.
OF MINN., (2009), available at www.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2009/feb09
/public_defenders.html. There was a tremendous amount of support for the
public defenders office. For example, Michael Ford, President of the Minnesota
State Bar Association, led a group lobbying on behalf of public defense funding.
Id. County Attorneys also publicly supported public defense funding. See Susan
Gaertner, Editorial, A Court System Starved Equals Justice Denied, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Apr. 8, 2009, available at www.startribune.com/opinion
/commentary/42706427.html (arguing against any additional cuts to public
defense funding); Joy Powell, Dakota County Public Defenders Buried In Cases, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 1, 2009, available at http://www.startribune.com/local
/south/42258087.html (quoting Dakota County Attorney Jim Backstrom that
public defenders are “‘woefully’ underfunded,” and that without more funding
“our system of equal and fair justice for all will begin to erode”). In addition, The
Coalition to Preserve Minnesota’s Justice System was created. It included
Minnesota Supreme Court Justice Eric Magnuson, district court judges, the
President of the Minnesota State Bar Association, the County Attorneys
Association, the City Attorneys Association, the Board of Public Defense, the
Minnesota Sheriffs Association, the Minnesota Chiefs of Police Association, the
League of Women Voters, ASFCME, and the Teamsters. See The Coalition to Preserve
Minnesota’s Justice System (on file with author); see also The Coalition to Preserve
Minnesota's Justice System, Ramsey Cnty. Bar Ass'n, http://www.ramseybar.org
/courtfunding_coalition.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2011). The coalition held
press conferences, met with legislative leaders, and pushed for funding for all
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budget allocation for 2011 calls for a further reduction to $64.7
165
million, although larger cuts than that are likely given the
166
anticipated $6 billion state budget deficit for FY 2011.
Minnesota law allowing for client reimbursement for attorney’s
167
fees was enacted in 1965, and this law remained in effect when
168
the state took over financial responsibility for indigent defense.
In an attempt to generate additional revenue, and consistent with
national trends, in 2002 the Minnesota legislature established a $28
169
public defender copayment.
In 2003, in response to a budget
deficit, the legislature made all copayments nonwaivable, and
increased copayments to: $200 for a felony, $100 for a gross
misdemeanor, $50 for a misdemeanor, $100 for a child in a
170
juvenile case, and $200 for an adult in a child protection case.
Copayments returned to $28 after the 2003 changes were deemed

justice system entities. Id. While it was able to minimize budget cuts to public
defense, there were still significant reductions in public defense funding. See Eric
J. Magnuson, The State of the Judiciary, BENCH AND B. OF MINN., Aug. 10, 2010,
available
at
http://mnbenchbar.com/2010/08/the-state-of-the-judiciary/
(explaining how the coalition worked hard to spread the word about justice system
funding, but that resources still dwindled).
165. E-mail from Kevin Kajer to author, supra note 162, attachment 1.
166. Baird Helgeson, Deep Cuts, Regardless of Outcome, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
July 25, 2010, at B1. According to proposals articulated by the five major
candidates for governor, cuts to state funding will range from $680 million to $8.4
billion, and there is no indication public defense will be spared cuts under any
candidate’s plan. Id.
167. MINN. STAT. § 611.20 (1965).
Today, money collected through
reimbursements are distributed to part-time public defenders to offset their
overhead costs, and does not constitute additional money the Board of Public
Defense can use to pay for additional attorneys or support the state. PUBLIC
DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 150, at 64–70 (discussing reimbursement in
Minnesota and recommending that the law be changed to allow the Board of
Public Defense “to use the funds as it sees fit”). Consistent with the experiences of
other states, reimbursement collections have not resulted in significant revenues,
producing only $928,047 in the two year period of 2007–2009. Id. at 67.
168. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.20 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010) (noting minor
changes in the law in 1993, 1994, and 1995).
169. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.17 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010) (noting the addition
of the $28 copayment in 2002); 2002 Minn. Laws 36.
170. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.17 (West 2009); 2003 Minn. Laws 1402. Of the
money collected from copayments, the first $2.74 million was to be deposited in
the general fund and any additional money was earmarked for the Board of Public
Defense. Id. Minnesota only generated $93,000 during the first three months of
its nonwaivable application fee, even though the program was expected to
generate $5 million each year. Amy Sherman, Defendants Squeezed for Drug Tests,
Probation Fees Are Part of Trend to Help Pay for Criminal Defense, PIONEER PRESS, Dec.
27, 2003, at B1.
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171

unconstitutional.
Finally, effective July 1, 2009, public defender
copayments were raised to $75 per case, regardless of the type of
172
case.
Despite the various plans to raise alternative revenue, public
defense in Minnesota was funded entirely from legislative
173
allocations from the general fund. However, in 2009, while once
again facing a budget deficit, the Minnesota legislature authorized
the Minnesota Supreme Court to increase attorney license fees as a
174
way of generating additional resources for indigent defense. The
Minnesota Supreme Court agreed to temporarily raise attorney fees
175
by $75 per year for a two-year period.
As a result of the budget cuts, the number of public defenders
in Minnesota declined dramatically. In March of 2007, for
example, there were 423 full time equivalent (FTE) public
176
defenders.
By May of 2009, this number had decreased to 376
177
FTEs, and by June 2010 it had been further reduced to 352
178
FTEs.
Just as the massive increase in resources nationwide were
insufficient to meet the needs of indigent defense, Minnesota’s
budget increases, even in the times of state budget surpluses, have
fallen far short of what was necessary to adequately fund indigent

171. State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403, 410 (Minn. 2004).
172. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.17 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010). Even with the
increase in copayments, collections were modest, amounting to $499,000 in fiscal
year 2009. See e-mail from Rebecca Pirius, Legislative Analyst, Minnesota House of
Representatives Research, to author (June 10, 2010) (on file with author).
173. PUB. DEF. BOARD, AGENCY PROFILE, supra note 157, at 1. There are
mandatory fines and various surcharges assessed to all fines in traffic and criminal
cases, but these funds go into the general fund, with some amounts diverted to
victim assistance programs or chemical dependency programs, depending upon
the crime committed. See MINN. STAT. § 609.101 (2008 & Supp. 2009) (discussing
mandatory fines and the distribution of the collected fines); MINN. STAT. § 357.021
subdiv. 7 (2008 & Supp. 2009) (discussing the distribution of mandatory
surcharges to the general fund, peace officer training fund, and the Department
of Natural Resources).
174. MINN. STAT. § 481.22 (Supp. 2009).
175. See Order Temporarily Increasing Lawyer Registration Fees, C1-81-1206
(Minn. 2009), available at www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/supct/0911
/ORC1811206-1104.pdf. The Court made it clear that it believed funding was the
responsibility of the governor and the legislature, and was agreeing to a one-time
fee because of “exceptional financial circumstances currently facing the courts and
the state in general”. Id. at 4.
176. E-mail from Kevin Kajer to author, supra note 162, attachment 3.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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defense. After the 1991 caseload review authorized by the
179
legislature, the State Board of Public Defense established that a
full time lawyer should handle no more than 100–150 felonies,
250–300 gross misdemeanors, 400 misdemeanors, 80 child welfare
180
cases, 175 juvenile cases, or 200 other cases annually.
Recognizing that most Minnesota public defenders handled a
mixed caseload rather than simply doing misdemeanors or
felonies, the State Board of Public Defense quantified the levels of
effort associated with different types of cases by adopting the system
181
of weighting cases based on the 1991 caseload review.
A
misdemeanor case was used as a standard unit, and all other cases
were converted into units based upon the ratio of the maximum
182
number of cases in that category versus misdemeanors.
As a
183
result, a felony case was assigned 2.67 units, a gross misdemeanor
184
185
was 1.33 units, a child protection case was five units, and a
186
An attorney’s weighted
juvenile delinquency was 2.29 units.
caseload was determined by adding up the units for each case
handled during the year. The caseload limits have not changed
187
since they were adopted.
179. See generally WEIGHTED CASELOAD STUDY, supra note 117 (discussing the
findings of the caseload study).
180. Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 1996); TWO INDIGENT
DEFENSE SYSTEMS, supra note 148, at 14 n.10 (citing THE SPANGENBERG GROUP,
RECOMMENDED CASELOAD STANDARDS FOR DISTRICT PUBLIC DEFENDERS IN MINNESOTA
(1991)). The numbers adopted by the State Board of Public Defense differ from
the recommendations made by the Spangenberg Group in two significant ways.
First, the Spangenberg Group recommended that homicides be treated differently
from all other felonies and that no lawyer handles more than three homicides per
year if that was all the lawyer did for the year. WEIGHTED CASELOAD STUDY, supra
note 117, at 70–71. On top of that, the Spangenberg Group recommended
capping felonies at 100–120 annually. Id. The State Board of Public Defense
decided to treat homicides no different than all other felonies and to cap felonies
at 100–150 cases annually. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d at 4. The Spangenberg
recommendations were based upon sufficient support staff for the attorneys,
including one legal secretary for every four lawyers, one investigator for every
three felony lawyers or six lawyers handling other types of cases. WEIGHTED
CASELOAD STUDY, supra note 117, at 76–77.
181. PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 150, at 28.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 29 n.9 (400/150 = 2.67).
184. Id. (400/300 = 1.33).
185. Id. (400/80 = 5).
186. Id. (400/175 = 2.29).
187. PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 150, at 28. Critics of the 1991
caseload standards note that Minnesota’s criminal statutes and associated
consequences have changed the nature of public defense. Id. at 30. “More

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss2/19

32

Herlofsky and Isaacman: Minnesota's Attempts to Fund Indigent Defense: Demonstrating the

2011]

INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING IN MINNESOTA

591

Regardless of budgetary limitations, public defenders cannot
188
In 1991, attorneys in Hennepin County,
decline new clients.
Minnesota were handling caseloads fifty percent higher than the
189
recommended maximums.
This translated to a weighted
190
caseload of 600. By 2001, the weighted caseload had risen to 864,
191
and it was at 868 in 2003. By 2007, statewide weighted caseloads
had fallen slightly to 748, still almost double the maximum
192
The next year, caseloads dropped to 714 cases per
caseload.
193
lawyer, in large part because the State Board of Public Defense
determined that public defenders would no longer represent
194
parents in child protection cases. In 2009, even while refusing to
handle the child protection cases, the weighted caseloads increased
195
to an average of 779 per attorney.
One result of the crushing caseloads was that public defender
offices stopped providing some services, even on the cases they
were legally obligated to handle. For example, in the First and
complex cases and serious consequences” mean the amount of time each public
defender needs to spend on each case goes up. Id. In addition, “collateral
consequences” have increased, “includ[ing] denied access to public assistance or
student loans . . . and loss of immigration status, jobs, or housing.” Id. at 39. An
increase in the number of clients who do not speak English or suffer from mental
illness or chemical dependency has also significantly added to the amount of time
spent on each case. Id. at 40.
188. Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 1996); Dziubak v. Mott, 503
N.W.2d 771, 775 (Minn. 1993) (noting that “a public defender may not reject a
client, but is obligated to represent whomever is assigned to her or him, regardless
of her or his current caseload . . .”).
189. Kennedy, 544 N.W.2d at 5.
190. The state and national standard for weighted caseloads is a maximum of
400 per attorney per year. PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 150, at 35.
191. E-mail from Kevin Kajer to author, supra note 162.
192. PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 150, at 36. It appears the weighted
caseload numbers may actually underestimate caseloads of individual attorneys.
The State Board counts all FTEs, even vacant positions it has no intention of
filling. Id. at 31. As of May 2009, as many as twenty-two positions were vacant due
to salary-saving leaves. Id. at 33. Because the vacant positions are not handling
cases, the actual number of cases handled by lawyers may be significantly higher.
193. Id. at 36.
194. PUBLIC DEFENSE BOARD, supra note 157, at 9. Although a parent is entitled
to an attorney in a child protection case, the law does not require that the public
defender’s office provide the attorney. Id. Rather, that financial obligation falls
upon the individual counties. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.331, subdiv. 3(4) (2008); In
re Welfare of the Child of S.L.J., 772 N.W.2d 833 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (ruling
that the county that commenced a termination of parental rights (TPR) case
against an indigent parent was statutorily obligated to pay reasonable
compensation to the parent’s appointed private attorney).
195. PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 150, at 36.
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Seventh Districts, public defenders stopped covering misdemeanor
196
arraignment calendars. In the Fifth District, a waitlist was created
197
for certain misdemeanor cases. The First and Fifth Districts also
198
stopped staffing certain courts or court calendars. The situation
became so bad that union members filed a grievance in the Third
199
Judicial District.
As a result, the weighted caseloads standard
forced public defenders to represent clients in numbers far above
national standards; they struggled to find the time and resources to
200
devote to each case.
To meet the state weighted caseloads
standards, state spending would need to increase to approximately
201
With the projected $6 billion deficit
$108.4 million annually.
202
looming on the horizon the likelihood of getting additional
203
resources from the legislature is slim.

196. Id. at 33–34. These calendars were not covered, despite the fact that an
arraignment calendar is considered a “critical stage” where the right to counsel
attaches. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961).
197. PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 150, at 33.
198. Id. This was especially true of drug courts, where many clients continue
to appear in court as part of their period of probation. Public defenders no
longer appeared with these clients, unless there was a claim that the client violated
the conditions of his or her probation and faced being sent to jail or prison. See id.
at 34.
199. Joy Powell, Stressed Public Defenders File Grievance, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
Apr. 12, 2010, available at www.startribune.com/local/90709914.html; Grievance
with Respect to Excessive Attorney Workloads from Martha Albertson et al., to
Karen Duncan, Chief Pub. Defender, Third Judicial Dist. (Mar. 5, 2010) (on file
with author).. According to the grievance, attorneys asked for caseload relief in
2009 but continued to receive new cases. Id. at 4. As a result, lawyers are unable
to have meaningful meetings with clients, prepare witness testimony at hearings,
review discovery in a timely fashion, or honor client’s constitutional right to a
speedy trial. Id. at 5. Public defenders lost cases they believe they could have won.
Id.
200. See Grievance with Respect to Excessive Attorney Workloads, supra 199.
201. E-mail from Kevin Kajer to author, supra note 162.
202. See sources cited supra notes 155, 157, and accompanying text (discussing
the Minnesota budget shortfall and resulting impact on program allocations).
203. PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 150, at 49. As the Legislative Auditor
noted, “[a]lthough we think adding more public defenders to the system would
address many of the concerns we identified, the likelihood of substantial funding
increases in the state’s current fiscal environment is small.” Id. See also White,
supra note 9, at 545 (recognizing that as a result of political realities, adequate
funding for indigent defense will remain problematic); Lefstein, supra note 9, at
840 (stating “unless there are fundamental changes in this nation’s approach to
providing defense services to the poor, the struggle to do so will continue
indefinitely”).
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V. DEDICATING THE REVENUE GENERATED FROM A FIVE-CENT TAX
PER DRINK OF ALCOHOL TO PUBLIC DEFENSE WOULD MEET
MINNESOTA’S CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
Minnesota has historically relied upon dedicated funding for
204
Some dedication of funds is spelled out in the
particular uses.
205
Others are statutorily created by the
Minnesota Constitution.
206
legislature.
In some cases, the legislature has empowered other
207
governmental bodies to establish taxes for dedicated purposes.
Whatever the mechanism, Minnesotans have used dedicated
funding sources to meet specific societal needs. A dedicated
funding source for public defense is necessary to protect those who
cannot otherwise protect themselves through the political
208
process.
204. See generally MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 14 (supporting the Environmental and
National Resources Trust fund from proceeds from the state lottery); MINN.
CONST. art. XI, § 15 (supporting the Outdoor Heritage Fund by a general sales tax
increase); MINN. STAT. §§ 270.072–.078 (2010) (State Airports Fund); MINN. STAT. §
287.12 (2010) (County Revenue Fund).
205. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 14 (supporting the Environmental and
National Resources Trust fund from proceeds from the state lottery); MINN.
CONST. art. XI, § 15 (supporting the Outdoor Heritage Fund by a general sales tax
increase); MINN. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 5, 12, 13 (supporting the Highway User Tax
Fund by taxing motor vehicle and gasoline sales).
206. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 16A.724, 297I.05 (2010) (Health Care Access
Fund); MINN. STAT. § 256.9658 (2010) (Heath Impact Fund); MINN. STAT. §§
270.072–.078 (2010) (State Airports Fund), MINN. STAT. § 287.12 (2010) (County
Revenue Fund).
207. A recent example of this was the authorization that allowed Hennepin
County to raise sales taxes to finance the building of the new Twins baseball
stadium. MINN. STAT. § 473.757, subdivs. 10, 11 (2009).
208. Lee, supra note 101, at 404, 407 (noting that often “‘[l]egislatures,
responding to voters fearful of crime, have no incentive to devote scarce resources
to the defense function rather than to additional police or prison space’” and in
tough budgetary times “indigent defense is one of the first things to go”); Wright
& Logan, supra note 73, at 2068 (quoting Robert Kennedy as stating “[t]he poor
man charged with crime has no lobby”); Donald Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote
Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn, 44
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1089 (1993) (concluding that legislatures routinely decline
to uphold the rights of criminal defendants because “a far larger number of
persons, of much greater political influence, rationally adopt the perspective of a
potential crime victim rather than the perspective of a suspect or defendant”).
According to a national survey, only six percent of respondents believed funding
for indigent defense should be decreased. BELDON, RUSSONELLO & STEWART, THE
OPEN SOC’Y INST. & NAT’L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS’N, DEVELOPING A NATIONAL
MESSAGE FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE: ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL SURVEY 7 (2001)
[hereinafter NATIONAL MESSAGE], available at www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents
/1211996548.53/Polling%20results%20report.pdf. Despite general support for
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Establishing a dedicated tax on alcohol would accomplish
209
several goals. Each one-cent tax per “drink” would generate
210
approximately $25 million in revenue.
As such, a $.05 tax per
drink would generate more than enough to cover the $108.4
211
million needed to fully fund public defense statewide.
The legislature has attempted to create user fees for public
212
defense without much luck.
While not everyone who drinks
213
alcohol commits a crime, there has been a long accepted causal
214
link between alcohol and crime. Studies from around the world
demonstrate a positive correlation between high alcohol use and
215
with some studies
involvement in assaultive behavior,
demonstrating alcohol involvement in as much as sixty-eight

funding indigent defense, the calculus changes when the question is funding
indigent defense versus other government programs, and as a result public
defense budgets end up with an inadequate piece of the state funding pie. See,
e.g., id. at 7, 37.
209. For purposes of this tax, a “drink” is defined as 5 ounces of wine, 12
ounces of beer, or 1.5 ounces of distilled spirits. E-mail from Nina Manzi,
Legislative Analyst, Minn. House of Representatives Research, to author (June 3,
2010, 12:01 PM CST) (on file with author).
210. Id.
211. There are numerous options for the $20 million annual surplus
generated by the alcohol tax. First, the money could be used for caseload relief so
that attorneys are handling less than the maximum allowable number of cases.
Second, the money could sit in the account so that it can be used to pay for future
indigent defense needs. Third, the additional money could be used to provide
civil legal services for indigent clients. See Order Temporarily Increasing Lawyer
Registration Fees, supra note 175, at 6 (increasing attorney license fees by $25
annually to be allocated to the Legal Service Advisory Committee because civil
legal services are dramatically underfunded). Finally, excess revenue each year
could be transferred to the general fund, much like the Health Care Access Fund.
See MINN. STAT. § 16A.724 subdiv. 2(a) (2010).
212. See sources cited supra notes 158–63 and accompanying text.
213. LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, ALCOHOL AND
CRIME 1 (1998), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ac.pdf.
214. See, e.g., Christopher Carpenter, Heavy Alcohol Use and Crime: Evidence from
Underage Drunk Driving Laws, 50 J.L. & ECON. 539, 541 (2007), available at
http://web.gsm.uci.edu/~kittc/CarpenterJLEZTCrime0906.pdf (stating “there is
a causal role for heavy episodic alcohol use in the commission of nuisance and
property crimes”); Susan E. Martin, The Links Between Alcohol, Crime, and the
Criminal Justice System; Explanations, Evidence and Interventions, 10 AM. J. ON
ADDICTIONS 136 (2001) (noting that “[h]undreds of articles and studies have
shown that alcohol abuse is closely associated with violent and other criminal
offenses”); Stephen Tomsen, Alcohol, Violent Crime, and Social Power, 1 AUSTL. INST.
OF CRIMINOLOGY (1990), available at www.aic.gov.au/publications/previous
%20series/proceedings/1-27/~/media/publications/proceedings/01/tomsen.ashx.
215. Tomsen, supra note 214, at 2.
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216

percent of assaults, sixty-seven percent of incidents of domestic
217
218
Alcohol
violence, and almost half of all gun or knife attacks.
was also involved in about fifty to sixty-five percent of all sexual
219
assaults and murders.
Studies in the United States indicate that
about forty percent of all people in prison, on parole, or on
probation for violent crimes were using alcohol at the time they
220
committed their crimes, and that alcohol played a role in the
221
A more recent study for
incarceration of 56.6% of all inmates.
the state of Wyoming concluded that from 2006 to 2008, sixty-nine
222
percent of all arrests involved alcohol.

216. Id. at 3 (citing B. Roslund & C. Larson, Crimes of Violence and Alcohol Abuse
in Sweden, 14 INT’L J. ON ADDICTIONS 1103 (1979)). One study indicated assault
suspects consumed alcohol in as much as eighty-two percent of the cases. Gary
McClelland & Linda Teplin, Alcohol Intoxication and Violent Crime: Implications for
Public Health Policy, 10 AM. J. ON ADDICTIONS 70, 71 (Supp. 2001).
217. GREENFELD, supra note 213, at v ; Tomsen, supra note 214, at 3 (citing C.
Hamilton & J. Collins, The Role of Alcohol In Wife Beating and Child Abuse: A Review of
The Literature, in DRINKING AND CRIME: PERSPECTIVES ON THE RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 285 (J. Collins ed.,
1982)).
218. Tomsen, supra note 214, at 3 (citing NEW SOUTH WALES BUREAU OF CRIME
STATISTICS AND RESEARCH, 1974, 1977a, 1977b).
219. Sara Markowitz, Alcohol, Drugs and Violent Crime, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
20, 21 (2005) (citing J.R. Tinklenberg & F.M. Ochberg, Patterns of Adolescent Violent:
A California Sample, in BIOBEHAVIORAL ASPECTS OF AGGRESSION 121 (D.A. Hamberg
& M.B. Trudeau eds., 1981); M.E. Wolfgang & R.B. Strohm, The Relationship
Between Alcohol and Criminal Homicide, 17 Q.J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 411 (1956)).
220. GREENFELD, supra note 213, at iii, 21. The study also reports that over
forty percent of murders involved alcohol, over thirty percent of sexual assaults
involved alcohol, and nearly half of all assaults involved alcohol. Id. at 21. For
public order crimes (DUI, weapons, commercial vice) seventy-five percent of all
probationers used alcohol prior to the commission of their crimes. Id.
221. The NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, COLUMBIA UNIV.,
BEHIND BARS II: SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION 2 (2010),
available at www.casacolumbia.org/articlefiles/575-report2010behindbars2.pdf. In
addition to all people convicted of alcohol law violations, it included 51.6% of all
drug offenders, 55.9% of all property offenders, 57.7% of all violent crime
offenders, and 52% of all other offenders. Id.
222. WYO. ASS’N OF SHERIFFS & CHIEFS OF POLICE, ALCOHOL & CRIME IN
WYOMING, 2006–2008, at 5 (2009), available at http://www.wascop.com/Alcohol
%20and%20Crime%20In%20Wyoming%202006-2008%20(2).pdf.
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In addition, the average blood alcohol level at the time of the
223
criminal activity ranged from .14 to .30. While studies could not
conclude definitively that alcohol use increased the risk of violence,
a review of the studies demonstrated that “offender populations
224
usually were found to contain ‘heavy’ or ‘problem’ drinkers.”
225
While binge drinkers
are only twenty percent of the
226
population, they consume eighty-three percent of all the alcohol.
And, while frequent binge drinkers are only six percent of the
population, they consume fifty percent of all alcohol in the United
227
States. As such, a tax on alcohol would be paid primarily by those
228
who abuse alcohol, many of whom end up in the criminal justice
229
system.
In addition, increasing the cost of alcohol would have societal
230
It
benefits. Increasing the cost of alcohol may decrease crime.
223. GREENFELD, supra note 213, at vii. According to the estimates, the average
blood alcohol level for all offenders who received probation was .16, while those
who were in prison averaged .27. Id. Blood alcohol levels for violent crimes
seemed to mirror these averages, while blood alcohol levels for property crime
offenders were higher than the average, and blood alcohol levels for DUI and vice
crimes were slightly lower than the overall average. Id.
224. Id. at 2 (citing NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING
VIOLENCE 184–85 (Albert J. Reiss & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., Nat’l Acad. Press 1993)).
225. A “binge” drinker is a person who drinks five or more drinks on one
occasion. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DRINKING IN
AMERICA: MYTHS, REALITIES, AND PREVENTION POLICY 1 (1999) [hereinafter
DRINKING IN AMERICA] available at http://breitlinks.com/alcoholawareness
/AlcAwarePDFs/DrinkinginAmerica.pdf.
226. Id. at 2. In Minnesota, binge drinkers made up approximately fifteen
percent of the population. MINN. INST. OF PUB. HEALTH, MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN
SERVS., SUBSTANCE USE IN MINNESOTA A STATE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL PROFILE 51 (Mar.
2009), available at http://docs.sumn.org/MNStateEpiProfile2009.pdf. Of the
population as a whole, 58.4% reported drinking within thirty days of being
surveyed, leaving 41.6% of the population as not consuming alcohol on a regular
basis. Id. at 10.
227. DRINKING IN AMERICA, supra note 225, at 2. According to an estimate by
the National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, in 2004 there were 17.6
million people in the United States who either depended on alcohol or abused
alcohol. Alcohol and Crime, NAT’L PARTNERSHIP ON ALCOHOL MISUSE & CRIME,
http://www.alcoholandcrime.org/npamc/issues/alcohol-and-crime (last visited
Oct. 21, 2010).
228. DRINKING IN AMERICA, supra note 225, at 4 (stating that “the vast majority
of Americans would feel little or no impact from a price increase because they do
not drink or drink very little and infrequently”); Martin, supra note 214, at 148
(noting that “much of the alcohol-related crime is the result of heavy drinking
episodes of non-dependent drinkers”).
229. See supra Part IV and notes 217–218.
230. See Markowitz, supra note 219, at 24 (summarizing studies from across the
world which appear to demonstrate that increased alcohol costs, including added
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would also more accurately reflect the impact alcohol has on
society. Current taxes on alcohol are insufficient to compensate
231
for the societal harm alcohol causes. For Minnesota in particular,
alcohol tax generated $234 million in 2001, while alcohol use cost
232
Enacting this tax and
the state an estimated $4.5 billion.
dedicating it to public defense would eliminate the need to support
public defense with money from the general fund. As a result,
there would be an additional $65.4 million in the general fund to
be used for other purposes.
There is an indication that public support for increasing
resources for indigent defense exists. Fifty-seven percent of people
surveyed nationwide believe that the states should guarantee
233
indigent defendants a lawyer with a reasonable caseload.
Additionally, almost fifty-six percent of Minnesotans support paying

alcohol tax, would result in lower rates of robbery, assault, and sexual assault). In
addition, Markowitz’s analysis indicated that an increase in beer tax would result
in a decrease in assaults, but not sexual assaults and robberies. Id. at 37–39. See
also Carpenter, supra note 214, at 4 (noting that reduction in alcohol use results in
a decrease in nuisance and property crimes); Martin, supra note 214, at 150
(noting that an increase in alcohol tax would result in a decrease in motor vehicle
death and violence, and specifically reduce rapes, assaults, and robberies); Susan
E. Martin et al., Trends in Alcohol Use, Cocaine Use, and Crime: 1989-1998, 34 J. DRUG
ISSUES 333, 351–52 (2004) (noting that a reduction in alcohol availability and
misuse will decrease crime rates, particularly violent crimes).
231. For every $1 in taxes on alcohol or tobacco raised for state and federal
coffers, government spends $8.95 for the consequences of smoking and alcohol
abuse. NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, COLUMBIA UNIV., SHOVELING
UP II: THE IMPACT OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE ON FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL BUDGETS iii
(2009), available at www.casacolumbia.org/articlefiles/380-ShovelingUpII.pdf. In
2005, federal spending as a result of alcohol abuse and addiction was $238.2
billion, state spending was $135.8 billion, and local government spending was
$93.8 billion. Id. at 2. This constituted 10.7% of all government spending in the
United States. Id. at i. At the same time, federal, state, and local taxes on alcohol
generated only $14.0 billion in 2005. Id. at 4.
232. MINN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, THE HUMAN AND ECONOMIC COST OF ALCOHOL
USE IN MINNESOTA 1 (2004), available at www.health.state.mn.us/cdrr/alcohol
/alcpdf/final2004costfactsheet.pdf.
233. NATIONAL MESSAGE, supra note 208, at 5. The specific question asked:
Please tell if you think each of the things in the list should be guaranteed
by the government to low-income people accused of a crime, is important
but should not be guaranteed, is not very important, or is not at all
important for someone accused of a crime. . . . A lawyer with a small
enough case load to provide the time necessary to prepare a defense for
each person.
Id. at 42. Thirty-seven percent of those surveyed indicated that it was important
but not a right. Id. It is also worthy to note that sixty-four percent of people
surveyed supported using taxpayer dollars for indigent defense. Id. at 4.
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additional fees on alcohol to help offset some of the costs of
234
alcohol to the state, such as health and safety. A modest $.05 tax
per drink would guarantee adequate indigent defense while
reducing some of the impact alcohol abuse has on the state’s
general fund.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the half-century since Gideon v. Wainwright, legislatures in
every state have failed to protect the constitutional right to a
235
Even in times of economic prosperity, funding for
lawyer.
indigent defense has fallen short. In times of budget shortfalls,
236
budgets for indigent defense have been slashed.
As a result,
lawyers representing poor defendants have struggled with
untenable caseloads to provide competent representation for their
237
clients.
One way to protect budgets from the feeding frenzy
during times of budget shortfalls is to have a dedicated funding
source. The funding to ensure the constitutional right to counsel
would no longer be forced to compete against popular programs or
services.
The failure to adequately fund indigent defense hurts all of us.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that the
underfunding of legal services for indigent clients has resulted in
238
the suffering of the court system as a whole.
It undermines
confidence in the justice system, congests the courts, and increases
the likelihood of innocent people being convicted. As former U.S.
Attorney General Janet Reno stated, “Our criminal justice system is
interdependent: if one leg of the system is weaker than the others,
239
By using a nominal tax
the whole system will ultimately falter.”
on alcohol, sufficient revenue could be generated to benefit all
Minnesotans, as well as to insure that equal justice exists for all,
regardless of economic background.
234. MINN. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, STATE FAIR POLL RESULTS 2 (2006),
available at www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hinfo/Fair/2006Results.pdf.
235. See supra Part II.
236. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
237. See supra Part II.C.
238. Order Temporarily Increasing Lawyer Registration Fees, supra note 175,
at 6.
239. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEMS THROUGH EXPANDED STRATEGIES AND INNOVATIVE COLLABORATIONS:
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE xiii (1999), available at
www.sado.org/fees/icjs.pdf.
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